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Abstract
A market consisting of a generator with thermal and renewable generation capability, a set of non-preemptive loads (i.e., loads
which cannot be interrupted once started), and an independent system operator (ISO) is considered. Loads are characterized by
durations, power demand rates and utility for receiving service, as well as disutility functions giving preferences for time slots
in which service is preferred. Given this information, along with the generator’s thermal generation cost function and forecast
renewable generation, the social planner solves a mixed integer program to determine a load activation schedule which maximizes
social welfare. Assuming price taking behavior, we develop a competitive equilibrium concept based on a relaxed version of
the social planner’s problem which includes prices for consumption and incentives for flexibility, and allows for probabilistic
allocation of power to loads. Considering each load as representative of a population of identical loads with scaled characteristics,
we demonstrate that the relaxed social planner’s problem gives an exact solution to the original mixed integer problem in the
large population limit, and give a market mechanism for implementing the competitive equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the roughly century long history of the electrical power grid, the situation facing both grid managers and end users
has remained largely the same: electricity available on demand. In the case of the latter, operation of lightbulbs, television sets
and other appliances has been just the flip of a switch away, while for the former, the set of available controls and actions
was over supply, i.e. which generators to activate, how much to generate and when [6]. Managers have consistently succeeded
in providing an adequate supply to meet the demand of end users from second to second largely due to the fact that over the
past century, demand forecasting has reached day ahead accuracy within 5% [4].
Recently, circumstances have changed on both the supply and demand sides of the grid. Increased adoption of renewables
means that the available power supply is becoming less controllable. Thus, even in the presence of relatively predictable
aggregate load, forecasting errors in excess load can be significant. Meanwhile, the rise of networked appliances, homes and
buildings is now facilitating synchronization and coordination of consumption to the extent that the demand side flexibility
stands to become one of the most important assets available to grid operators [5]. Water heaters and electric vehicles (EV)
typify loads characterized by such flexibility. A newly published report from the Brattle Group estimates that load flexibility
could be expanded to satisfy nearly 20 percent of US peak demand, and avoid nearly $18 billion in annual generation capacity,
energy, transmission and ancillary service costs [3].
Currently, aggregate flexibility is leveraged through demand response programs. Typically these programs are used to reduce
peaks in demand, either by indirect load control via real-time pricing or direct control, where utilities have the ability to turn
devices on or off. Moving forward, much of the additional benefit is expected to come from expanding the use of demand
response to applications such as load shifting and building, e.g., to track a time varying supply of renewable energy, and
services such as frequency regulation and voltage control [3].
This work considers a population of non-preemptive loads, i.e., loads which must be served continuously for a predetermined
amount of time without interruption. Users report their level of discomfort for being served at each time slot of a finite time
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2horizon. The social planner is tasked with serving these loads has access to a thermal generator with convex generation cost,
as well as a renewable generator with zero marginal cost. Given the users’ preferences, thermal generator’s cost function, and
knowledge of the renewable generator’s output, the scheduler determines an efficient schedule in the sense of cost minimization.
We seek to answer the following questions: How can these flexible loads be scheduled over the available time slots? Once a
schedule has been determined, how should users be compensated for their flexibility? What is the “price of inflexibility” in
this setting?
Our main results are as follows. We first give mixed binary optimization problems for the non-preemptive loads, a profit
maximizing thermal generator, and an independent system operator (ISO), which is tasked with ensuring supply/demand balance.
We then consider the convex relaxations of the load and ISO problems, and formulate a centralized welfare maximization
problem in order to study efficiency properties of market outcomes. We then prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium for
this setting, i.e., we show that there exist prices for per unit energy consumption and inflexibility such that the thermal generator
produces efficient levels at each time step, and the LSE schedules loads such that demand equals supply while respecting the
loads’ flexibility preferences. Finally, we establish fundamental theorems of welfare economics for the decentralized setting.
Related work. [2] examines a setting similar to the one presented here in continuous time. Prices for load consumption and
inflexibility are derived as dual variables to the scheduler’s convex optimization problem, and a competitive equilibrium with
respect to reported loads reported consumption level and duration is studied. The paper also studies a discretized time setting,
and describes approximately optimal scheduling and pricing heuristics. More recently, [5] details a power exchange platform
allowing for random arrivals of buy and sell orders, as well as flexible consumers. A fluid relaxation of the discrete time flexible
scheduling problem together with a projection method for deriving a feasible schedule is presented, and the fluid solution shown
to be optimal asymptotically as the number of flexible consumers tends to infinity. Marginal pricing, given a schedule of the
flexible loads is shown to be inadmissable with respect to incoming offers, and modification for the nonconvex discrete time
scheduling problem is left to future work. [1] studies the scheduling and pricing of deadline differentiated loads, wherein the
longer a consumer is willing to defer, the lower the price in energy they will pay. The derived pricing scheme is shown to
yield a competitive equilibrium between the consumers and supplier and, when used in tandem with earliest-deadline-first
scheduling, is incentive compatible in terms of reported deadlines.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The market consists of M non-preemptive loads (or consumers) and a single thermal generator. Additionally, an ISO
(independent system operator) ensures safe grid operation. Let T = [1, . . . , T ] denote the discrete time horizon over which
loads are scheduled and served. For simplicity, we assume a single bus network model. We assume throughout that all entities
are price taking, i.e., their actions do not affect market prices.
Each load i is characterized by a tuple (τi, li, U i, udSi· , u
dE
i· ), where τi gives the duration in time slots, li gives the consumption
level, and udSi· and u
dE
i· give the disutility functions of consumer i due to service starting prior to or after a desired service
window, respectively. That is, consumer i demands li MW of electricity for τi consecutive time slots, and derives utility U i
as their load is fulfilled. Figure 1 plots an example pair of disutility functions vectors.Thus, the consumer’s overall utility is a
function of the flexibility that it allows for in the scheduling of its load.
Denote xCi := (x
C
i1, . . . , x
C
iT ) ∈ {0, 1}T . We will similarly define vector and matrix valued quantities throughout. Given
3Fig. 1: Example disutility functions.
flexibility incentives pSi ∈ RT+ and pEi ∈ RT+, consumer i solves the following optimization problem:
(CONi) min
xCi ∈{0,1}T
yCi ∈{0,1}T , zCi ∈{0,1}T
∑
t
pconit x
C
it − U i
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xCit +
∑
t
(
(1− yCit )(udSit − pSit) + (1− zCit )
(
udEit − pEit
))
s.t.
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xCir ≤ τi(1− yCit ) ∀ t (1)
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xCir ≤ τi(1− zCit ) ∀ t. (2)
If xCit = 1, then consumer i chooses to start their load service at time slot t and pay price p
con
it . The inner sums on the left
hand side in constraints (1) and (2) give the on/off status of load i at each time slot s. The term (1 − yCit ) = 1 when load
i has been activated prior to or at time slot t. In such a case, load i incurs disutility udSit ≥ 0 for having started by time t,
but is compensated pSit. Similarly, (1 − zCit ) = 1 indicates that load i will be active at or after time slot t, with udEit and pEit
analogous to udSit and p
S
it.
The generator is characterized by its thermal generation cost function c(·) : R+ → R+, which is assumed to be strictly
convex, increasing and twice differentiable on R+. In addition to the generator’s thermal plant, we assume that it also owns a
renewable generator which produces energy at zero marginal cost. The output of the renewable generator, g : T → (0,∞) is
assumed to be known at time t = 0. Given prices pgen ∈ RT+, the generator chooses generation levels qG ∈ RT+ to solve the
following profit maximization problem
(GEN) max
qG≥0
∑
t
(
pgent (q
G
t + gt)− c(qGt )
)
.
4Finally, the ISO determines the set of admissible load and generation schedules by solving
(ISO) min
qI≥0
xI∈{0,1}
∑
t
pgent
qIt + gt −∑
i
li
∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xIis

s.t.
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xIis − gt ≤ qIt ∀ t.
A. The Social Planner’s Problem
In order to study the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium given later, we introduce a social planning problem.
The social planner is concerned with the combined welfare of all market participants. Specifically, the social planner collects the
profiles of each load i, and schedules them so that each is served without interruption for their entire duration. Let xˆit ∈ {0, 1}
denote the social planner’s decision as to whether load i will begin service in time slot t, where xˆit = 1 denotes that load i
will start at time slot t. A schedule is then defined as xˆ ∈ {0, 1}M×T . The social planner selects a schedule, auxiliary load
status variables yˆ and zˆ, and corresponding generation levels qˆ := (qˆ1, . . . , qˆt) in order to solve the following problem
(SPP) min
qˆ≥0, xˆ∈{0,1}M×T
yˆ∈{0,1}M×T , zˆ∈{0,1}M×T
∑
t
c(qˆt) +
∑
i
∑
t
udSit (1− yˆit) +
∑
i
∑
t
udEit (1− zˆit)−
∑
i
U i
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xˆit
s.t.
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆis − gt ≤ qˆt ∀ t (3)
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆir ≤ τi(1− yˆit) ∀ i, t (4)
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆir ≤ τi(1− zˆit) ∀ i, t. (5)
In order to develop prices for electricity consumption and load inflexibility, as well as a competitive equilibrium concept,
we relax the binary constraints on xˆ, yˆ and zˆ, and consider the following problem:
(SPP-R) min
qˆ,xˆ,yˆ,zˆ≥0
∑
t
c(qˆt) +
∑
i
∑
t
udSit (1− yˆit) +
∑
i
∑
t
udEit (1− zˆit)−
∑
i
U i
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xˆit
s.t. λˆt :
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆis − gt ≤ qˆt ∀ t (6)
νˆSit :
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆir ≤ τi(1− yˆit) ∀ i, t (7)
νˆEit :
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆir ≤ τi(1− zˆit) ∀ i, t. (8)
It can be shown that constraints (7) and (8) ensure that all entries of xˆ, yˆ and zˆ are less than 1, and also that
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xˆit ≤ 1 ∀ i, t. (9)
Under relaxation, since in addition to (9), each xˆit satisfies 0 ≤ xˆit ≤ 1, it can be interpreted as a probability that a given
load of type i will be scheduled at time slot t, i.e., that the planner will choose xˆi· ∈ RT equal to et, the T th standard basis
5vector. Therefore, xˆ in (SPP-R) gives a probabilistic schedule for the loads and if, for a given i, (9) holds with equality, then
load i is certain to be activated at some point. Otherwise, the load is only has a chance of being activated during the horizon
T . Fixing a matrix of probabilities xˆ, (1− yˆit) and (1− zˆit) give probabilities that load i has been activated up to time t, and
will be active from time slot t onward, respectively. Consequently, the (SPP-R) objective may be viewed as the expectation of
overall social welfare, and the constraints as being met in expectation. This interpretation is key to the competitive equilibrium
definition and properties we detail in later sections.
Note that due to the nonnegativity of udSit and u
dE
it for all i, t, for any fixed xˆ, it is always optimal to choose each entry of
(1 − yˆ) and (1 − zˆ) as small as possible. Therefore constraints (7) and (8) may be replaced with equalities, and matrices yˆ
and zˆ are completely determined given a particular xˆ.
Problem (SPP-R) has Lagrangian
L =
∑
t
c(qˆt) +
∑
i
∑
t
udSit (1− yˆit) +
∑
i
∑
t
udEit (1− zˆit)−
∑
i
U i
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xˆit
+
∑
t
λˆt
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆis − gt − qˆt

+
∑
i
∑
t
νˆSit
 t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆir − τi(1− yˆit)

+
∑
i
∑
t
νˆEit
 T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆir − τi(1− zˆit)
 .
(10)
Let
pλˆit = li
min{T,t+τi−1}∑
s=t
λˆs
pνˆit =
T∑
s=t
νˆSismin{s− t+ 1, τi}+
min{T,t+τ−1}∑
s=1
νˆEismin{T − t+ 1, τi, τi − (s− t)}.
(11)
See Appendix A for the derivation of pλˆ and pνˆ . The (SPP-R) Lagrangian can be rearranged as
L =
∑
t
(
c(qˆt)− λˆt(qˆt + gt)
)
+
∑
i
∑
t
(
pλˆit + p
νˆ
it
)
xˆit −
∑
i
U i
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xˆit
+
∑
i
∑
t
(1− yˆit)(udSit − νˆSitτi) +
∑
i
∑
t
(1− zˆit)(udEit − νˆEit τi),
(12)
and in addition to feasibility, the KKT conditions for (SPP-R) are
c′(qˆ∗t )− λˆ∗t ≥ 0 ∀ t (13)
qˆ∗t
(
c′(qˆ∗t )− λˆ∗t
)
= 0 ∀ t (14)
pλˆ
∗
it + p
νˆ∗
it − U i ≥ 0 ∀ i, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (15)
xˆ∗it
(
pλˆ
∗
it + p
νˆ∗
it − U i
)
= 0 ∀ i, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (16)
pλˆ
∗
it + p
νˆ∗
it ≥ 0 ∀ i, t > T − τi + 1 (17)
xˆ∗it
(
pλˆ
∗
it + p
νˆ∗
it
)
= 0 ∀ i, t > T − τi + 1 (18)
6τiνˆ
S∗
it − udSit ≥ 0 ∀ i, t (19)
yˆ∗it
(
τiνˆ
S∗
it − udSit
)
= 0 ∀ i, t (20)
τiνˆ
E∗
it − udEit ≥ 0 ∀ i, t (21)
zˆ∗it
(
τiνˆ
E∗
it − udEit
)
= 0 ∀ i, t (22)
λˆ∗t
(∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆ∗is − gt − qˆ∗t
)
= 0 ∀ t (23)
λˆ∗t ≥ 0 ∀ i, t. (24)
B. Consumer’s Problem
The second (SPP-R) Lagrangian expression (12) suggests the following decomposition of the relaxed social planner’s problem
into relaxed versions of the individual entity problems presented above. Starting with the consumer problems, we have
(CON-Ri) min
xCi , y
C
i
zCi ≥0
∑
t
pconit x
C
it − U i
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xCit +
∑
t
(
(udSit − pSit)(1− yCit ) +
(
udEit − pEit
)
(1− zCit )
)
s.t. θSit :
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xCir = τi(1− yCit ) ∀ t (25)
θEit :
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xCir = τi(1− zCit ) ∀ t. (26)
The optimality conditions for (CON-Ri) are
pconit − U i + pθ
∗
it ≥ 0 ∀ i, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (27)
xC∗it
(
pconit − U i + pθ
∗
it
)
= 0 ∀ i, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (28)
pconit + p
θ∗
it ≥ 0 ∀ i, t > T − τi + 1 (29)
xC∗it
(
pconit + p
θ∗
it
)
= 0 ∀ i, t > T − τi + 1 (30)
pSit − udSit + τiθS∗it ≥ 0 ∀ i, t (31)
yC∗it
(
pSit − udSit + τiθS∗it
)
= 0 ∀ i, t (32)
pEit − udEit + τiθE∗it ≥ 0 ∀ i, t (33)
zC∗it
(
pEit − udEit + τiθE∗it
)
= 0 ∀ i, t, (34)
where pθ
∗
it is defined analogously to p
νˆ
it in (11).
Again, under the relaxation on the binary constraints on xCi , y
C
i and z
C
i , we may interpret the consumer’s problem as
selecting probabilities of activation for each time slot t, in the interest of maximizing their expected net utility (here written
in minimization form).
C. Generator and ISO Problems
The generator’s problem remains the same as before
(GEN-R) max
q≥0
∑
t
(
pgent q
G
t − c(qGt + gt)
)
, (35)
7with optimality conditions
c′(qG∗t )− pgent ≥ 0 ∀ t (36)
qG∗t
(
c′(qG∗t )− pgent
)
= 0 ∀ t. (37)
Finally, the relaxed ISO problem is given by
(ISO-R) min
qI≥0
xI≥0
∑
t
pgent
qIt + gt −∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xIis

s.t. αt :
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xIis − gt ≤ qIt ∀ t,
with optimality conditions
pgent − α∗t ≥ 0 ∀ t (38)
qI∗t
(
pgent − α∗t
)
= 0 ∀ t (39)
−ppgenit + pα
∗
it ≥ 0 ∀ t (40)
xI∗t
(
−ppgenit + pα
∗
it
)
= 0 ∀ t, (41)
α∗t
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xI∗is − gt − qI∗t
 = 0 ∀ t (42)
α∗t ≥ 0 ∀ t, (43)
where pp
gen
it and p
α∗
it are defined analogously to p
λˆ
it in (11). Note that (38)-(41) and can always be satisfied by choosing
α∗t = p
gen
t for all t. Therefore, only constraints (42) and (43), along with feasibility need be considered assuming α
∗
t = p
gen
t
for all t.
III. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND THEOREMS OF WELFARE ECONOMICS
We now give our competitive equilibrium definition, and explore existence, as well as welfare properties of such an
equilibrium.
Definition 1: (Competitive Equilibrium). A tuple (q∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, pcon∗, pS∗, pE∗, pgen∗) with pgen∗ ≥ 0 is said to be a
competitive equilibrium if, given (pcon∗i , p
S∗
i , p
E∗
i ), (x
∗
i , y
∗
i , z
∗
i ) solves (CON-Ri) for each i, q
∗ solves (GEN-R), given pgen*,
q∗ solves (GEN-R), and given pgen∗, (q∗, x∗) solves (ISO-R).
As noted in the previous section since solutions to (CON-Ri) will, in general, give values of xCit ∈ [0, 1], the quantities
(x∗, y∗, z∗) in the competitive equilibrium in definition 1 have probabilistic interpretations: consumers select probabilities xCit
of being scheduled at each time slot t ∈ T , in order to maximize their expected net utility.
Our first result addresses the existence of the competitive equilibrium defined above.
Theorem 1: There exists a competitive equilibrium, given by an optimal solution to (SPP-R), (qˆ∗, xˆ∗, yˆ∗, zˆ∗), and the
following prices derived from an optimal dual solution to (SPP-R)
pcon∗it = p
λˆ∗
it + p
νˆ∗
it , p
S∗
it = τiνˆ
S∗
it , p
E∗
it = τiνˆ
E∗
it , p
gen∗
t = λˆ
∗
t
(44)
for all i and t.
8Proof 1: Given price selections according to (44), and selecting qG = qI = qˆ∗, xCi = x
I
i = xˆ
∗
i for all i, y
C
i = yˆ
∗
i and
zCi = zˆ
∗
i for all i makes the collected optimality conditions (aside from feasibility) for (CON-Ri) for each i, (GEN-R) and
(ISO-R)
c′(qˆ∗t )− λˆ∗t ≥ 0 ∀ t (45)
qˆ∗t
(
c′(qˆ∗t )− λˆ∗t
)
= 0 ∀ t (46)
pλˆ∗it + p
νˆ∗
it − U i + pθ∗it ≥ 0 ∀ i, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (47)
xˆ∗it
(
pλˆ∗it + p
νˆ∗
it − U i + pθ∗it
)
= 0 ∀ i, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (48)
pλˆ∗it + p
νˆ∗
it + p
θ∗
it ≥ 0 ∀ i, t > T − τi + 1 (49)
xˆ∗it
(
pλˆ∗it + p
νˆ∗
it + p
θ∗
it
)
= 0 ∀ i, t > T − τi + 1 (50)
νˆS∗it τi − udSit + θS∗it τi ≥ 0 ∀ i, t (51)
yˆ∗it
(
νˆS∗it τi − udSit + θS∗it τi
)
= 0 ∀ i, t (52)
νˆE∗it τi − udEit + θE∗it τi ≥ 0 ∀ i, t (53)
zˆ∗it
(
νˆE∗it τi − udEit + θE∗it τi
)
= 0 ∀ i, t (54)
λˆ∗t
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xI∗is − gt − qI∗t
 = 0 ∀ t (55)
λˆ∗t ≥ 0 ∀ t. (56)
Further selecting θS∗it = θ
E∗
it = 0 for all i and t gives
c′(qˆ∗t )− λˆ∗t ≥ 0 ∀ t (57)
qˆ∗t
(
c′(qˆ∗t )− λˆ∗t
)
= 0 ∀ t (58)
pλˆ∗it + p
νˆ∗
it − U i ≥ 0 ∀ i, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (59)
xˆ∗it
(
pλˆ∗it + p
νˆ∗
it − U i
)
= 0 ∀ i, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (60)
pλˆ∗it + p
νˆ∗
it ≥ 0 ∀ i, t > T − τi + 1 (61)
xˆ∗it
(
pλˆ∗it + p
νˆ∗
it
)
= 0 ∀ i, t > T − τi + 1 (62)
νˆS∗it τi − udSit ≥ 0 ∀ i, t (63)
yˆ∗it
(
νˆS∗it τi − udSit
)
= 0 ∀ i, t (64)
νˆE∗it τi − udEit ≥ 0 ∀ i, t (65)
zˆ∗it
(
νˆE∗it τi − udEit
)
= 0 ∀ i, t (66)
λˆ∗t
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xI∗is − gt − qI∗t
 = 0 ∀ t (67)
λˆ∗t ≥ 0 ∀ t. (68)
These expressions are identical to the (SPP-R) KKT conditions, and therefore satisfied by optimal solutions to (SPP-R). As
a primal solution to (SPP-R), (xˆ∗, yˆ∗, zˆ∗) also satisfies the collected constraints from (CON-Ri) for each i, (GEN-R) and
9(ISO-R). 
While solutions to (SPP-R) yield competitive equilibria, the converse holds true as well, given in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: Any competitive equilibrium forms an optimal solution for (SPP-R).
Proof 2: By definition, the competitive equilibrium (q∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, pcon∗, pS∗, pE∗, pgen∗) satisfies
c′(q∗t )− pgen∗t ≥ 0 ∀ t (69)
q∗t
(
c′(q∗t )− pgen∗t
)
= 0 ∀ t (70)
pcon∗it + p
θ∗
it − U i ≥ 0 ∀ i, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (71)
x∗it
(
pcon∗it + p
θ∗
it − U i
)
= 0 ∀ i, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (72)
pcon∗it + p
θ∗
it ≥ 0 ∀ i, t > T − τi + 1 (73)
x∗it
(
pcon∗it + p
θ∗
it
)
= 0 ∀ i, t > T − τi + 1 (74)
pS∗it + τiθ
S∗
it − udSit ≥ 0 ∀ i, t (75)
y∗it
(
pS∗it + τiθ
S∗
it − udSit
)
= 0 ∀ i, t (76)
pE∗it + τiθ
E∗
it − udEit ≥ 0 ∀ i, t (77)
z∗it
(
pE∗it + τiθ
E∗
it − udEit
)
= 0 ∀ i, t (78)
pgen∗t − α∗t ≥ 0 ∀ t (79)
q∗t
(
pgen∗t − α∗t
)
= 0 ∀ t (80)
−ppgen∗it + pα
∗
it ≥ 0 ∀ t (81)
x∗t
(
−ppgen∗it + pα
∗
it
)
= 0 ∀ t (82)
α∗t
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
x∗is − gt − q∗t
 = 0 ∀ t (83)
α∗t ≥ 0 ∀ t (84)
for some θS∗, θE∗ and α∗ ≥ 0, as well as the feasibility conditions for each of the individual entity problems. Therefore,
observing that for any pgen∗ ≥ 0 the form of the objective in (ISO-R) ensures that complementary slackness condition (23)
will be satisfied at the competitive equilibrium, selecting (qˆ∗, xˆ∗, yˆ∗, zˆ∗) = (q∗, x∗, y∗, z∗) as the primal variables, and dual
variables λˆ∗ = pgen∗ = α∗ and (νˆS∗it , νˆ
E∗
it ) = (p
S∗/τi+θS∗it , p
E∗/τi+θE∗it ) for all i, t, forms optimal primal and dual solutions
to (SPP-R). 
IV. REPLICATED AND LARGE ECONOMIES
Note that in general a competitive equilibrium doesn’t exist when the social planner’s problem is a mixed integer programming
problem. Nevertheless, our definition of competitive equilibrium allows for probabilistic allocation to consumers, and thus the
competitive equilibrium existence is related to the existence of a primal and dual solution to the (relaxed) (SPP-R) problem.
In this section we justify the study of this relaxed problem by demonstrating its equivalence to the original, binary constrained
(SPP) when each load i is interpreted as representing an infinite population of identical loads, with scaled demand.
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Suppose that each load i is replicated N times, and that the resulting loads have demand, utility and disutility scaled by N .
Indexing the replicas of each type i with the index n, the binary constrained SPP with N replication is
(SPP(N )) min
qˆ≥0
xˆ∈{0,1}M×N×T
yˆ∈{0,1}M×N×T
zˆ∈{0,1}M×N×T
∑
t
c (qˆt)−
∑
i
∑
n
U i
N
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xˆint +
∑
i
∑
n
∑
t
udSit
N
(1− yˆint) +
∑
i
∑
n
∑
t
udEit
N
(1− zˆint)
(85)
s.t. λˆt :
∑
i
∑
n
li
N
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆins − gt ≤ qˆt ∀ t (86)
νˆSint :
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆinr = τi(1− yˆint) ∀ i, n, t (87)
νˆEint :
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆinr = τi(1− zˆint) ∀ i, n, t. (88)
We refer to the problem with N replication which relaxes the binary constraint on xˆ as SPP(N )-R (instead of SPP(1)-R, we
will still refer to the original relaxed problem as SPP-R). When we wish to emphasize the dependence of decision variables
on the replication factor N , we will append (N), e.g. xˆint(N).
Proposition 3: Let (qˆ∗, xˆ∗, yˆ∗, zˆ∗, λˆ∗, νˆS∗, νˆE∗) denote an optimal solution to SPP-R. Then for any N , an optimal solution
to SPP(N )-R can be formed by setting xˆ∗int(N) = xˆ
∗
it, yˆ
∗
int(N) = yˆ
∗
it, zˆ
∗
int(N) = zˆ
∗
it, for all i, n, t, λˆ
∗
t (N) = λˆ
∗
t for all t,
and νˆS∗int(N) = νˆ
S∗
it /N and νˆ
E∗
int(N) = νˆ
E∗
it /N for all i and t.
Proof 3: SPP(N )-R has KKT conditions
c′(qˆ∗t (N))− λˆ∗t (N) ≥ 0 ∀ t (89)
qˆ∗t (N)
(
c′(qˆ∗t (N))− λˆ∗t (N)
)
= 0 ∀ t (90)
pλˆ∗it (N)
N
+ pνˆ∗int(N)−
U i
N
≥ 0 ∀ i, n, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (91)
xˆ∗int(N)
(
pλˆ∗it (N)
N
+ pνˆ∗int(N)−
U i
N
)
= 0 ∀ i, n, t ≤ T − τi + 1 (92)
pλˆ∗it (N)
N
+ pνˆ∗int(N) ≥ 0 ∀ i, n, t > T − τi + 1 (93)
xˆ∗int(N)
(
pλˆ∗it (N)
N
+ pνˆ∗int(N)
)
= 0 ∀ i, n, t > T − τi + 1 (94)
τiνˆ
S∗
int(N)−
udSit
N
≥ 0 ∀ i, n, t (95)
yˆ∗int(N)
(
τiνˆ
S∗
int(N)−
udSit
N
)
= 0 ∀ i, n, t (96)
τiνˆ
E∗
int(N)−
udEit
N
≥ 0 ∀ i, n, t (97)
zˆ∗int(N)
(
τiνˆ
E∗
int(N)−
udEit
N
)
= 0 ∀ i, n, t (98)
λˆ∗t (N)
(∑
i
li
N
∑
n
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆ∗ins(N)− gt − qˆ∗t (N)
)
= 0 ∀ t (99)
λˆ∗t (N) ≥ 0 ∀ t. (100)
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The proof of the theorem follows from making the selections specified in the theorem statement, substituting into (89)-(100),
and comparing with (13)-(24). 
While Proposition 3 states that an optimal probabilistic schedule xˆ∗(N) in the problem with N replication can be derived
from an optimal probabilistic schedule xˆ∗ for (SPP-R) and specifies how to do so, in the limit as N → ∞ we can use xˆ to
generate an optimal deterministic, binary constrained schedule if we interpret xˆ∗it as the proportion of the population of type
i to be activated at time t. This is stated formally in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: An optimal solution to SPP(∞) is given by activating proportion xˆ∗it of type i population at time t for each i
and t, where xˆ∗ is an optimal solution to SPP-R.
Proof 4: Note that constraints (87) and (88) may be rewritten
yˆint = 1− 1
τi
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆinr ∀ i, n, t
zˆint = 1− 1
τi
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆinr ∀ i, n, t,
(101)
so that overall SPP(N ) can be written as
min
qˆ≥0, xˆ∈{0,1}
∑
t
c (qˆt) +
∑
i
∑
t
udSit
 1
τi
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
1
N
∑
n
xˆinr
 (102)
+
∑
i
∑
t
udEit
 1
τi
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
1
N
∑
n
xˆinr
 (103)
−
∑
i
U i
T−τi+1∑
t=1
1
N
∑
n
xˆint (104)
s.t. λˆt :
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
1
N
∑
n
xˆins − gt ≤ qˆt ∀ t. (105)
Now, if xˆint(N) is considered as a Bernoulli random variable with P (xˆint(N) = 1) = xˆ∗it and qˆ
∗
t (N) is chosen as qˆ
∗
t (1) = qˆt
for all t, then by the Law of Large Numbers, constraint (105) converges to
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆ∗is − gt ≤ qˆ∗t ∀ t.
Similarly, the objective function converges to
∑
t
c (qˆ∗t ) +
∑
i
∑
t
udSit
 1
τi
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆ∗ir

+
∑
i
∑
t
udEit
 1
τi
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆ∗ir

−
∑
i
U i
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xˆ∗it.
(106)
Since the optimal objective of the relaxed problem provides a lower bound for the binary constrained problem, and the power
balance constraint is satisfied in the limit as N → ∞, the solution produced by randomly activating loads according to xˆ∗
converges to an optimal binary constrained solution as N →∞. 
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V. MARKET MECHANISM FOR LARGE POPULATION ECONOMY
The competitive equilibrium definition given in the previous section allows for non-binary activation schedule x∗. As
mentioned, since 0 ≤ x∗it ≤ 1, and
∑
t x
∗
it ≤ 1, each x∗it may be interpreted as giving the portion of load i activated at
time t under relaxation of the binary constraints on the activation schedule or, alternatively, the probability that an individual
load of type i in the infinite replication setting is fully activated at time t.
Let us explore the infinitely replicated setting from the perspective of an individual load n of type i. First, note that
(SPP(N )-R) has Lagrangian
L =
∑
t
c (qˆt(N))− λˆt(N)(qˆt(N) + gt) +
∑
n
∑
i
∑
t
(
udSit
N
(1− yˆint(N)) + u
dE
it
N
(1− zˆint(N))
)
−
∑
n
∑
i
∑
t
τiνˆ
S
int(N)(1− yˆint(N))
−
∑
n
∑
i
∑
t
τiνˆ
S
int(N)(1− zˆint(N))
+
∑
n
∑
i
∑
t
(
pλˆint(N)
N
+ pνˆint(N)
)
xˆint(N)
−
∑
i
U i
N
∑
n
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xˆint(N)
(107)
where
pλˆint(N) = li
min{T,t+τi−1}∑
s=t
λˆs(N)
pνˆint(N) =
T∑
s=t
νˆSins(N)min{s− t+ 1, τi}+
min{T,t+τi−1}∑
s=1
νˆEins(N)min{T − t+ 1, τi, τi − (s− t)}.
(108)
Thus, under N replication and relaxation, the optimization problem for consumer n of type i is given by
(CONin(N)-R) min
xCin,y
C
in
zCin≥0
∑
t
pconint(N)x
C
int −
U i
N
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xCint
+
∑
t
((
udSit
N
− pSint
)
(1− yCint) +
(
udEit
N
− pEint
)
(1− zCint)
)
s.t. θSint :
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xCinr = τi(1− yCint) ∀ t (109)
θEint :
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xCinr = τi(1− zCint) ∀ t. (110)
Multiplying by N , the (CONin(N)-R) objective function can be written as
∑
t
Npconintx
C
int − U i
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xCint +
∑
t
(
udSit −NpSint
)
(1− yCint) +
∑
t
(
udEit −NpEint
)
(1− zCint). (111)
As in Theorem 1, set
pconint(N) =
pλˆ∗int(N)
N
+ pνˆ∗int(N), p
S
int(N) = τiνˆ
S∗
int(N), p
E
int = τiνˆ
E∗
int(N), p
gen∗
t (N) = λˆ
∗
t (N),
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and as in Proposition 3, choose
λˆ∗t (N) = λˆ
∗
t (1) = λˆ
∗
t , νˆ
S∗
int(N) = νˆ
S∗
it /N, νˆ
E∗
int(N) = νˆ
E∗
it /N.
Then letting N →∞ gives
lim
N→∞
Nτiνˆ
S∗
int(N) = τiνˆ
S∗
it , lim
N→∞
Nτiνˆ
E∗
int(N) = τiνˆ
E∗
it . (112)
This implies that
lim
N→∞
Npconint(N) = p
λˆ∗
it + p
νˆ∗
it .
Therefore, posing the prices described in Proposition 3 in the limit as N → ∞, the objective functions for each (CONin)
converge to
∑
t
(
pλˆ
∗
it + p
νˆ∗
it
)
xCint − U i
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xCint +
∑
t
(
udSit − τiνˆS∗it
)
(1− yCint) +
∑
t
(
udEit − τiνˆE∗it
)
(1− zCint).
Thus, the pricing facing each load of type i is identical, and in fact the problem facing each is the same as the single load
of type i in the decomposition with relaxation but not replication. Further, each will select the same xC∗in· = xˆ
∗
i· ∈ RT+, where
xC∗int = xˆ
∗
it gives the probability that the load will be scheduled at time t.
The following mechanism (FLEX-SCHED(N )) uses the probability values selected by the continuum of consumers to
generate a binary constrained schedule in the setting with N replication. Note that since the generator’s problem does not
involve consumer utility and disutility functions, nor consumer scheduling variables, its problem is not affected by replication
(or relaxation). Therefore (GEN(N)) is the same as (GEN) for all N , including N =∞ .
1) Each consumer (i, n) submits udSi· and u
dE
i· , and the generator submits c to the social planner.
2) The social planner solves (SPP-R), and announces (pcon∗, pS∗, pE∗, pgen∗, pbal∗) as specified in Theorem 1.
3) Each consumer i solves (CON(∞)-Rin), the generator solves (GEN(∞)), and (x∗i , y∗i , z∗i ) for all i, as well as q∗ are
submitted to the ISO.
4) The ISO randomly assigns proportion x∗i of loads of type i to start at time t, for each i and t. The generator produces
q∗ over the finite horizon. Combined with the renewable generation output g, this generated power is allocated to the
consumers according to x∗i and demands li for each i.
In the large population setting, the following result regarding (FLEX-SCHED(∞)) holds.
Theorem 5: The mechanism (FLEX-SCHED(∞)) is ex-post individually rational, budget balanced and efficient.
Proof 5: Let us denote realizations of the randomized scheduled specified by x∗ as x˜, and similarly for other variables.
Starting with ex-post individual rationality, suppose that for some i we have that
∑
t x
∗
it < 1, so that a portion of population
i will not be activated. Then x˜int = 0 for all t, and y˜int = z˜int = 1 for all t, so that the objective of (CON(∞)-Rin), i.e., the
realized net utility of load n of type i is equal to 0.
In all other cases, load n of type i is scheduled, so that for some t˜in where (SPP-R) KKT conditions (15) and (16) are
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satisfied, x˜int = 1. Due to constraints (109) and (110), in (CON(∞)-Rin), we have that
y˜int =

1 t ≤ t˜in − 1
1− t−t˜in+1τi t˜in ≤ t ≤ t˜in + τi − 2
0 t ≥ t˜in + τi − 1
z˜int =

0 t ≤ t˜in
t−t˜in
τi
t˜in + 1 ≤ t ≤ t˜in + τi − 1
1 t ≥ t˜in + τi
.
(113)
Substituting x˜, y˜ and z˜ and the equilibrium prices from step 2 of (FLEX-SCHED) into expression (111) gives
pλˆ∗it˜in + p
νˆ∗
it˜in
− U i +
t˜in+τi−2∑
t=t˜in
(
1− t− t˜in + 1
τi
)
(udSit − τiνˆS∗it )
+
T∑
t=t˜in+τi−1
(udSit − τiνˆS∗it ) +
t˜in∑
t=1
(udEit − τiνˆE∗it )
+
t˜in+τi−1∑
t=t˜in+1
t− t˜in
τi
(udEit − τiνˆE∗it ).
(114)
The term pλˆ∗
it˜in
+ pνˆ∗
it˜in
− U i is equal to 0 due to (SPP-R) KKT conditions (15) and (16) and the fact that t˜ is a time index
where xˆit˜ > 0. The terms in the sums are nonpositive due to (SPP-R) KKT conditions (19) and (21). Thus, each user will
incur nonnegative net utility when participating in the mechanism, regardless of whether or not they are scheduled.
In this context, budget balance is achieved if∑
t
pgent (q
G
t + gt) +
∑
t
∑
i
∑
n
pSint(1− yCint) +
∑
t
∑
i
∑
n
pEint(1− zCint) =
∑
i
∑
t
∑
n
pconintx
C
int. (115)
Selecting xCint = x
∗
it = xˆ
∗
it = for all n, and
pconint = p
con∗
it =
pλˆ∗it + p
νˆ∗
it
N
, (116)
the right hand side of (115) is equal to ∑
i
∑
t
pλˆ∗it xˆ
∗
it +
∑
i
∑
t
pνˆ∗it xˆ
∗
it. (117)
From the definition of pλˆ
∗
it and the power balance constraint (6) in (SPP-R), the left term in (117) is equal to∑
t
λˆ∗t
∑
i
li
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆ∗is =
∑
t
λˆ∗t (qˆ
∗
t + gt) =
∑
t
pgen∗t (q
∗
t + gt). (118)
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From the definition of pνˆ
∗
it and the flexibility constraints (7) and (8), the right term in (117) is equal to
∑
i
∑
t
νˆS∗it
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆ∗ir +
∑
i
∑
t
νˆE∗it
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆ∗ir
=
∑
i
∑
t
τiνˆ
S∗
it (1− yˆ∗it) +
∑
i
∑
t
τiνˆ
E∗
it (1− zˆ∗it)
=
∑
i
∑
t
pS∗it (1− y∗it) +
∑
i
∑
t
pE∗it (1− z∗it).
(119)
Summing the last expressions in (118) and (119) gives the left hand side of (115), showing that budget balance holds at the
competitive equilibrium. Finally, the mechanism is efficient by Theorem 4, as it randomly activates loads of type i according
to xˆ∗it.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we study how to schedule and price service for a population of flexible, but non-preemptive loads, in the
presence of renewable generation, as well as a dispatchable thermal generator. Formulating a collection of mixed integer
optimization programs for the consumers, and generator, we then study a centralized version of our setting, where the integer
constraints, allowing for use of Lagrangian analysis and derivation of prices. A solution of this centralized problem yields a
competitive equilibrium, and conversely a competitive equilibrium yields an efficient solutions.
There are several directions for future work in this area. First, in terms of the scheduling aspect, it is desirable to determine
a method for deriving at least an approximately optimal solution to the original integer constrained setting, given an efficient
solution to the relaxed social planner’s problem presented here. In terms of pricing, properties such as fairness should be
examined. For example, assuming that the disutility functions of each user can be at least partially ordered from less to more
restrictive, is the compensation offered to more flexible users more than to those which are not as flexible? It will also be of
interest to explore other types of loads, such as those which may be interrupted, as well as those which might accept less than
an upper bound of total energy delivered. Strategic behavior amongst market participants should also be taken into account,
as well as more detailed network modeling and constraints.
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APPENDIX A
pλˆ AND pνˆ DERIVATION
Start with pλˆ and the double sum
T∑
t=1
λˆt
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆis =
τi∑
t=1
λˆt
t∑
s=1
xˆis +
T∑
t=τi+1
λˆt
t∑
s=t−τi+1
xˆis. (120)
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Rearranging the first double sum, and breaking the second double sum on the right into separate sums based upon whether
the t value appears in the upper and/or lower argument of the inner sum:
=
τi∑
t=1
xˆit
τi∑
s=t
λˆs +
τi∑
t=2
xˆit
t+τi−1∑
s=τi+1
λˆs +
T−τi+1∑
t=τi+1
xˆit
t+τi−1∑
s=t
λˆs +
T∑
t=T−τi+2
xˆit
T∑
s=t
λˆs
=
τi∑
t=1
xˆit
t+τi−1∑
s=t
λˆs +
T−τi+1∑
t=τi+1
xˆit
t+τi−1∑
s=t
λˆs +
T∑
t=T−τi+2
xˆit
T∑
s=t
λˆs
=
T−τi+1∑
t=1
xˆit
t+τi−1∑
s=t
λˆs +
T∑
t=T−τi+2
xˆit
T∑
s=t
λˆs
=
T∑
t=1
xˆit
min{t+τi−1,T}∑
s=t
λˆs
(121)
Therefore, we define
pλˆit := li
min{t+τi−1,T}∑
s=t
λˆs. (122)
Now, we can rewrite the double sum
t∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆir =
t∑
s=1
xˆis
min{s+τi−1,t}∑
r=s
1
=
t∑
s=1
xˆismin{τi, t− s+ 1}.
(123)
Then, to develop the definition of pνˆ , start with:
T∑
t=1
νˆSit
t∑
s=1
xˆismin{τi, t− s+ 1} =
T∑
t=1
t∑
s=1
νˆSitxˆismin{τi, t− s+ 1}
=
T∑
t=1
xˆit
T∑
s=t
νˆSismin{τi, s− t+ 1}.
(124)
Therefore, each xˆit has the additional coefficient
T∑
s=t
νˆSismin{τi, s− t+ 1}.
Finally, considering the double sum
T∑
s=t
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆir =
T∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆir −
t−1∑
s=1
s∑
r=max{1,s−τi+1}
xˆir
=
T∑
s=1
xˆismin{τi, T − s+ 1} −
t−1∑
s=1
xˆismin{τi, t− 1− s+ 1}
=
T∑
s=1
xˆismin{τi, T − s+ 1} −
t−1∑
s=1
xˆismin{τi, t− s}
=
T−τi+1∑
s=1
xˆisτi +
T∑
s=T−τi+2
xˆis(T − s+ 1)−
t−τi∑
s=1
xˆisτi −
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆis(t− s)
=
T−τi+1∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆisτi +
T∑
s=T−τi+2
xˆis(T − s+ 1)−
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆis(t− s)
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=
t∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆis(τi − (t− s)) +
T−τi+1∑
s=t+1
xˆisτi +
T∑
s=T−τi+2
xˆis(T − s+ 1)
=
T∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆismin{τi − (t− s), τi, T − s+ 1}
Then
T∑
t=1
νˆEit
T∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
xˆismin{τi − (t− s), τi, T − s+ 1}
=
T∑
t=1
T∑
s=max{1,t−τi+1}
νˆEit xˆismin{τi − (t− s), τi, T − s+ 1}
=
T∑
t=1
xˆit
min{t+τi−1,T}∑
s=1
νˆEismin{τi − (s− t), τi, T − t+ 1}.
(125)
Therefore, the coefficient for each xˆit contains the term
min{t+τi−1,T}∑
s=1
νˆEismin{τi − (s− t), τi, T − t+ 1},
and thus we define:
pνˆit :=
T∑
s=t
νˆSismin{s− t+ 1, τi}+
min{t+τi−1,T}∑
s=1
νˆEismin{T − t+ 1, τi, τi − (s− t), }.
